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To the People of the State of New York:
THE Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered under two general points of view. The FIRST
relates to the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the government, including the restraints imposed on the
States. The SECOND, to the particular structure of the government, and the distribution of this power among its
several branches.
Under the FIRST view of the subject, two important questions arise: 1. Whether any part of the powers
transferred to the general government be unnecessary or improper? 2. Whether the entire mass of them be
dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction left in the several States?
Is the aggregate power of the general government greater than ought to have been vested in it? This is the FIRST
question.
It cannot have escaped those who have attended with candor to the arguments employed against the extensive
powers of the government, that the authors of them have very little considered how far these powers were
necessary means of attaining a necessary end. They have chosen rather to dwell on the inconveniences which must
be unavoidably blended with all political advantages; and on the possible abuses which must be incident to every
power or trust, of which a beneficial use can be made. This method of handling the subject cannot impose on the
good sense of the people of America. It may display the subtlety of the writer; it may open a boundless field for
rhetoric and declamation; it may inflame the passions of the unthinking, and may confirm the prejudices of the
misthinking: but cool and candid people will at once reflect, that the purest of human blessings must have a portion
of alloy in them; that the choice must always be made, if not of the lesser evil, at least of the GREATER, not the
PERFECT, good; and that in every political institution, a power to advance the public happiness involves a
discretion which may be misapplied and abused. They will see, therefore, that in all cases where power is to be
conferred, the point first to be decided is, whether such a power be necessary to the public good; as the next will
be, in case of an affirmative decision, to guard as effectually as possible against a perversion of the power to the
public detriment.
That we may form a correct judgment on this subject, it will be proper to review the several powers conferred on
the government of the Union; and that this may be the more conveniently done they may be reduced into different
classes as they relate to the following different objects: 1. Security against foreign danger; 2. Regulation of the
intercourse with foreign nations; 3. Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States; 4. Certain
miscellaneous objects of general utility; 5. Restraint of the States from certain injurious acts; 6. Provisions for
giving due efficacy to all these powers.
The powers falling within the FIRST class are those of declaring war and granting letters of marque; of providing
armies and fleets; of regulating and calling forth the militia; of levying and borrowing money.
Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential object
of the American Union. The powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to the federal councils.
Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question in the negative. It would be
superfluous, therefore, to enter into a proof of the affirmative. The existing Confederation establishes this power in
the most ample form.
Is the power of raising armies and equipping fleets necessary? This is involved in the foregoing power. It is
involved in the power of self-defense.
But was it necessary to give an INDEFINITE POWER of raising TROOPS, as well as providing fleets; and of
maintaining both in PEACE, as well as in war?
The answer to these questions has been too far anticipated in another place to admit an extensive discussion of
them in this place. The answer indeed seems to be so obvious and conclusive as scarcely to justify such a
discussion in any place. With what color of propriety could the force necessary for defense be limited by those
who cannot limit the force of offense? If a federal Constitution could chain the ambition or set bounds to the
exertions of all other nations, then indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of its own government, and set
bounds to the exertions for its own safety.
How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like manner, the
preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The means of security can only be regulated by the means
and the danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever determined by these rules, and by no others. It is in vain to
oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in vain; because it plants in the
Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a germ of unnecessary and
multiplied repetitions. If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for the service of ambition or
revenge, it obliges the most pacific nations who may be within the reach of its enterprises to take corresponding
precautions. The fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military establishments in the time of peace. They
were introduced by Charles VII of France. All Europe has followed, or been forced into, the example. Had the
example not been followed by other nations, all Europe must long ago have worn the chains of a universal
monarch. Were every nation except France now to disband its peace establishments, the same event might follow.
The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined valor of all other nations and rendered her
the mistress of the world.
Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her military triumphs; and that the liberties
of Europe, as far as they ever existed, have, with few exceptions, been the price of her military establishments. A
standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary, provision. On the smallest
scale it has its inconveniences. On an extensive scale its consequences may be fatal. On any scale it is an object of
laudable circumspection and precaution. A wise nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does
not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in
diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties.
The clearest marks of this prudence are stamped on the proposed Constitution. The Union itself, which it cements
and secures, destroys every pretext for a military establishment which could be dangerous. America united, with a
handful of troops, or without a single soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign ambition than America
disunited, with a hundred thousand veterans ready for combat. It was remarked, on a former occasion, that the
want of this pretext had saved the liberties of one nation in Europe. Being rendered by her insular situation and her
maritime resources impregnable to the armies of her neighbors, the rulers of Great Britain have never been able, by
real or artificial dangers, to cheat the public into an extensive peace establishment. The distance of the United
States from the powerful nations of the world gives them the same happy security. A dangerous establishment can
never be necessary or plausible, so long as they continue a united people. But let it never, for a moment, be
forgotten that they are indebted for this advantage to the Union alone. The moment of its dissolution will be the
date of a new order of things. The fears of the weaker, or the ambition of the stronger States, or Confederacies,
will set the same example in the New, as Charles VII did in the Old World. The example will be followed here
from the same motives which produced universal imitation there. Instead of deriving from our situation the precious
advantage which Great Britain has derived from hers, the face of America will be but a copy of that of the
continent of Europe. It will present liberty everywhere crushed between standing armies and perpetual taxes. The
fortunes of disunited America will be even more disastrous than those of Europe. The sources of evil in the latter
are confined to her own limits. No superior powers of another quarter of the globe intrigue among her rival
nations, inflame their mutual animosities, and render them the instruments of foreign ambition, jealousy, and
revenge. In America the miseries springing from her internal jealousies, contentions, and wars, would form a part
only of her lot. A plentiful addition of evils would have their source in that relation in which Europe stands to this
quarter of the earth, and which no other quarter of the earth bears to Europe. This picture of the consequences of
disunion cannot be too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves peace, every man who loves
his country, every man who loves liberty, ought to have it ever before his eyes, that he may cherish in his heart a
due attachment to the Union of America, and be able to set a due value on the means of preserving it. Next to the
effectual establishment of the Union, the best possible precaution against danger from standing armies is a limitation
of the term for which revenue may be appropriated to their support. This precaution the Constitution has prudently
added. I will not repeat here the observations which I flatter myself have placed this subject in a just and
satisfactory light. But it may not be improper to take notice of an argument against this part of the Constitution,
which has been drawn from the policy and practice of Great Britain. It is said that the continuance of an army in
that kingdom requires an annual vote of the legislature; whereas the American Constitution has lengthened this
critical period to two years. This is the form in which the comparison is usually stated to the public: but is it a just
form? Is it a fair comparison? Does the British Constitution restrain the parliamentary discretion to one year? Does
the American impose on the Congress appropriations for two years? On the contrary, it cannot be unknown to the
authors of the fallacy themselves, that the British Constitution fixes no limit whatever to the discretion of the
legislature, and that the American ties down the legislature to two years, as the longest admissible term.
Had the argument from the British example been truly stated, it would have stood thus: The term for which
supplies may be appropriated to the army establishment, though unlimited by the British Constitution, has
nevertheless, in practice, been limited by parliamentary discretion to a single year. Now, if in Great Britain, where
the House of Commons is elected for seven years; where so great a proportion of the members are elected by so
small a proportion of the people; where the electors are so corrupted by the representatives, and the
representatives so corrupted by the Crown, the representative body can possess a power to make appropriations
to the army for an indefinite term, without desiring, or without daring, to extend the term beyond a single year,
ought not suspicion herself to blush, in pretending that the representatives of the United States, elected FREELY
by the WHOLE BODY of the people, every SECOND YEAR, cannot be safely intrusted with the discretion over
such appropriations, expressly limited to the short period of TWO YEARS?
A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself. Of this truth, the management of the opposition to the federal government
is an unvaried exemplification. But among all the blunders which have been committed, none is more striking than
the attempt to enlist on that side the prudent jealousy entertained by the people, of standing armies. The attempt
has awakened fully the public attention to that important subject; and has led to investigations which must terminate
in a thorough and universal conviction, not only that the constitution has provided the most effectual guards against
danger from that quarter, but that nothing short of a Constitution fully adequate to the national defense and the
preservation of the Union, can save America from as many standing armies as it may be split into States or
Confederacies, and from such a progressive augmentation, of these establishments in each, as will render them as
burdensome to the properties and ominous to the liberties of the people, as any establishment that can become
necessary, under a united and efficient government, must be tolerable to the former and safe to the latter.
The palpable necessity of the power to provide and maintain a navy has protected that part of the Constitution
against a spirit of censure, which has spared few other parts. It must, indeed, be numbered among the greatest
blessings of America, that as her Union will be the only source of her maritime strength, so this will be a principal
source of her security against danger from abroad. In this respect our situation bears another likeness to the insular
advantage of Great Britain. The batteries most capable of repelling foreign enterprises on our safety, are happily
such as can never be turned by a perfidious government against our liberties.
The inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of them deeply interested in this provision for naval protection, and if
they have hitherto been suffered to sleep quietly in their beds; if their property has remained safe against the
predatory spirit of licentious adventurers; if their maritime towns have not yet been compelled to ransom
themselves from the terrors of a conflagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and sudden invaders, these
instances of good fortune are not to be ascribed to the capacity of the existing government for the protection of
those from whom it claims allegiance, but to causes that are fugitive and fallacious. If we except perhaps Virginia
and Maryland, which are peculiarly vulnerable on their eastern frontiers, no part of the Union ought to feel more
anxiety on this subject than New York. Her seacoast is extensive. A very important district of the State is an
island. The State itself is penetrated by a large navigable river for more than fifty leagues. The great emporium of
its commerce, the great reservoir of its wealth, lies every moment at the mercy of events, and may almost be
regarded as a hostage for ignominious compliances with the dictates of a foreign enemy, or even with the
rapacious demands of pirates and barbarians. Should a war be the result of the precarious situation of European
affairs, and all the unruly passions attending it be let loose on the ocean, our escape from insults and depredations,
not only on that element, but every part of the other bordering on it, will be truly miraculous. In the present
condition of America, the States more immediately exposed to these calamities have nothing to hope from the
phantom of a general government which now exists; and if their single resources were equal to the task of fortifying
themselves against the danger, the object to be protected would be almost consumed by the means of protecting
them.
The power of regulating and calling forth the militia has been already sufficiently vindicated and explained.
The power of levying and borrowing money, being the sinew of that which is to be exerted in the national defense,
is properly thrown into the same class with it. This power, also, has been examined already with much attention,
and has, I trust, been clearly shown to be necessary, both in the extent and form given to it by the Constitution. I
will address one additional reflection only to those who contend that the power ought to have been restrained to
external taxation by which they mean, taxes on articles imported from other countries. It cannot be doubted that
this will always be a valuable source of revenue; that for a considerable time it must be a principal source; that at
this moment it is an essential one. But we may form very mistaken ideas on this subject, if we do not call to mind in
our calculations, that the extent of revenue drawn from foreign commerce must vary with the variations, both in the
extent and the kind of imports; and that these variations do not correspond with the progress of population, which
must be the general measure of the public wants. As long as agriculture continues the sole field of labor, the
importation of manufactures must increase as the consumers multiply. As soon as domestic manufactures are
begun by the hands not called for by agriculture, the imported manufactures will decrease as the numbers of
people increase. In a more remote stage, the imports may consist in a considerable part of raw materials, which
will be wrought into articles for exportation, and will, therefore, require rather the encouragement of bounties, than
to be loaded with discouraging duties. A system of government, meant for duration, ought to contemplate these
revolutions, and be able to accommodate itself to them.
Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power of taxation, have grounded a very fierce attack against the
Constitution, on the language in which it is defined. It has been urged and echoed, that the power "to lay and
collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general
welfare of the United States," amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged
to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress
under which these writers labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction.
Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the
general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have had some color for it; though it would have
been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate in all possible cases. A
power to destroy the freedom of the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or the
forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by the terms "to raise money for the general welfare.
"But what color can the objection have, when a specification of the objects alluded to by these general terms
immediately follows, and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? If the different parts of the
same instrument ought to be so expounded, as to give meaning to every part which will bear it, shall one part of
the same sentence be excluded altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite
terms be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any signification whatsoever?
For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be
included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase,
and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an enumeration of particulars which
neither explain nor qualify the general meaning, and can have no other effect than to confound and mislead, is an
absurdity, which, as we are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the authors of the objection or on the
authors of the Constitution, we must take the liberty of supposing, had not its origin with the latter.
The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it appears that the language used by the convention is a copy
from the articles of Confederation. The objects of the Union among the States, as described in article third, are
"their common defense, security of their liberties, and mutual and general welfare. " The terms of article eighth are
still more identical: "All charges of war and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense or
general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury," etc.
A similar language again occurs in article ninth. Construe either of these articles by the rules which would justify the
construction put on the new Constitution, and they vest in the existing Congress a power to legislate in all cases
whatsoever. But what would have been thought of that assembly, if, attaching themselves to these general
expressions, and disregarding the specifications which ascertain and limit their import, they had exercised an
unlimited power of providing for the common defense and general welfare? I appeal to the objectors themselves,
whether they would in that case have employed the same reasoning in justification of Congress as they now make
use of against the convention. How difficult it is for error to escape its own condemnation!
PUBLIUS.
THE Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered under two general points of view. The FIRST
relates to the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the government, including the restraints imposed on the
States. The SECOND, to the particular structure of the government, and the distribution of this power among its
several branches.
Under the FIRST view of the subject, two important questions arise: 1. Whether any part of the powers
transferred to the general government be unnecessary or improper? 2. Whether the entire mass of them be
dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction left in the several States?
Is the aggregate power of the general government greater than ought to have been vested in it? This is the FIRST
question.
It cannot have escaped those who have attended with candor to the arguments employed against the extensive
powers of the government, that the authors of them have very little considered how far these powers were
necessary means of attaining a necessary end. They have chosen rather to dwell on the inconveniences which must
be unavoidably blended with all political advantages; and on the possible abuses which must be incident to every
power or trust, of which a beneficial use can be made. This method of handling the subject cannot impose on the
good sense of the people of America. It may display the subtlety of the writer; it may open a boundless field for
rhetoric and declamation; it may inflame the passions of the unthinking, and may confirm the prejudices of the
misthinking: but cool and candid people will at once reflect, that the purest of human blessings must have a portion
of alloy in them; that the choice must always be made, if not of the lesser evil, at least of the GREATER, not the
PERFECT, good; and that in every political institution, a power to advance the public happiness involves a
discretion which may be misapplied and abused. They will see, therefore, that in all cases where power is to be
conferred, the point first to be decided is, whether such a power be necessary to the public good; as the next will
be, in case of an affirmative decision, to guard as effectually as possible against a perversion of the power to the
public detriment.
That we may form a correct judgment on this subject, it will be proper to review the several powers conferred on
the government of the Union; and that this may be the more conveniently done they may be reduced into different
classes as they relate to the following different objects: 1. Security against foreign danger; 2. Regulation of the
intercourse with foreign nations; 3. Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States; 4. Certain
miscellaneous objects of general utility; 5. Restraint of the States from certain injurious acts; 6. Provisions for
giving due efficacy to all these powers.
The powers falling within the FIRST class are those of declaring war and granting letters of marque; of providing
armies and fleets; of regulating and calling forth the militia; of levying and borrowing money.
Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential object
of the American Union. The powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to the federal councils.
Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question in the negative. It would be
superfluous, therefore, to enter into a proof of the affirmative. The existing Confederation establishes this power in
the most ample form.
Is the power of raising armies and equipping fleets necessary? This is involved in the foregoing power. It is
involved in the power of self-defense.
But was it necessary to give an INDEFINITE POWER of raising TROOPS, as well as providing fleets; and of
maintaining both in PEACE, as well as in war?
The answer to these questions has been too far anticipated in another place to admit an extensive discussion of
them in this place. The answer indeed seems to be so obvious and conclusive as scarcely to justify such a
discussion in any place. With what color of propriety could the force necessary for defense be limited by those
who cannot limit the force of offense? If a federal Constitution could chain the ambition or set bounds to the
exertions of all other nations, then indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of its own government, and set
bounds to the exertions for its own safety.
How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like manner, the
preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The means of security can only be regulated by the means
and the danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever determined by these rules, and by no others. It is in vain to
oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in vain; because it plants in the
Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a germ of unnecessary and
multiplied repetitions. If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for the service of ambition or
revenge, it obliges the most pacific nations who may be within the reach of its enterprises to take corresponding
precautions. The fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military establishments in the time of peace. They
were introduced by Charles VII of France. All Europe has followed, or been forced into, the example. Had the
example not been followed by other nations, all Europe must long ago have worn the chains of a universal
monarch. Were every nation except France now to disband its peace establishments, the same event might follow.
The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined valor of all other nations and rendered her
the mistress of the world.
Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her military triumphs; and that the liberties
of Europe, as far as they ever existed, have, with few exceptions, been the price of her military establishments. A
standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary, provision. On the smallest
scale it has its inconveniences. On an extensive scale its consequences may be fatal. On any scale it is an object of
laudable circumspection and precaution. A wise nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does
not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in
diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties.
The clearest marks of this prudence are stamped on the proposed Constitution. The Union itself, which it cements
and secures, destroys every pretext for a military establishment which could be dangerous. America united, with a
handful of troops, or without a single soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign ambition than America
disunited, with a hundred thousand veterans ready for combat. It was remarked, on a former occasion, that the
want of this pretext had saved the liberties of one nation in Europe. Being rendered by her insular situation and her
maritime resources impregnable to the armies of her neighbors, the rulers of Great Britain have never been able, by
real or artificial dangers, to cheat the public into an extensive peace establishment. The distance of the United
States from the powerful nations of the world gives them the same happy security. A dangerous establishment can
never be necessary or plausible, so long as they continue a united people. But let it never, for a moment, be
forgotten that they are indebted for this advantage to the Union alone. The moment of its dissolution will be the
date of a new order of things. The fears of the weaker, or the ambition of the stronger States, or Confederacies,
will set the same example in the New, as Charles VII did in the Old World. The example will be followed here
from the same motives which produced universal imitation there. Instead of deriving from our situation the precious
advantage which Great Britain has derived from hers, the face of America will be but a copy of that of the
continent of Europe. It will present liberty everywhere crushed between standing armies and perpetual taxes. The
fortunes of disunited America will be even more disastrous than those of Europe. The sources of evil in the latter
are confined to her own limits. No superior powers of another quarter of the globe intrigue among her rival
nations, inflame their mutual animosities, and render them the instruments of foreign ambition, jealousy, and
revenge. In America the miseries springing from her internal jealousies, contentions, and wars, would form a part
only of her lot. A plentiful addition of evils would have their source in that relation in which Europe stands to this
quarter of the earth, and which no other quarter of the earth bears to Europe. This picture of the consequences of
disunion cannot be too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves peace, every man who loves
his country, every man who loves liberty, ought to have it ever before his eyes, that he may cherish in his heart a
due attachment to the Union of America, and be able to set a due value on the means of preserving it. Next to the
effectual establishment of the Union, the best possible precaution against danger from standing armies is a limitation
of the term for which revenue may be appropriated to their support. This precaution the Constitution has prudently
added. I will not repeat here the observations which I flatter myself have placed this subject in a just and
satisfactory light. But it may not be improper to take notice of an argument against this part of the Constitution,
which has been drawn from the policy and practice of Great Britain. It is said that the continuance of an army in
that kingdom requires an annual vote of the legislature; whereas the American Constitution has lengthened this
critical period to two years. This is the form in which the comparison is usually stated to the public: but is it a just
form? Is it a fair comparison? Does the British Constitution restrain the parliamentary discretion to one year? Does
the American impose on the Congress appropriations for two years? On the contrary, it cannot be unknown to the
authors of the fallacy themselves, that the British Constitution fixes no limit whatever to the discretion of the
legislature, and that the American ties down the legislature to two years, as the longest admissible term.
Had the argument from the British example been truly stated, it would have stood thus: The term for which
supplies may be appropriated to the army establishment, though unlimited by the British Constitution, has
nevertheless, in practice, been limited by parliamentary discretion to a single year. Now, if in Great Britain, where
the House of Commons is elected for seven years; where so great a proportion of the members are elected by so
small a proportion of the people; where the electors are so corrupted by the representatives, and the
representatives so corrupted by the Crown, the representative body can possess a power to make appropriations
to the army for an indefinite term, without desiring, or without daring, to extend the term beyond a single year,
ought not suspicion herself to blush, in pretending that the representatives of the United States, elected FREELY
by the WHOLE BODY of the people, every SECOND YEAR, cannot be safely intrusted with the discretion over
such appropriations, expressly limited to the short period of TWO YEARS?
A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself. Of this truth, the management of the opposition to the federal government
is an unvaried exemplification. But among all the blunders which have been committed, none is more striking than
the attempt to enlist on that side the prudent jealousy entertained by the people, of standing armies. The attempt
has awakened fully the public attention to that important subject; and has led to investigations which must terminate
in a thorough and universal conviction, not only that the constitution has provided the most effectual guards against
danger from that quarter, but that nothing short of a Constitution fully adequate to the national defense and the
preservation of the Union, can save America from as many standing armies as it may be split into States or
Confederacies, and from such a progressive augmentation, of these establishments in each, as will render them as
burdensome to the properties and ominous to the liberties of the people, as any establishment that can become
necessary, under a united and efficient government, must be tolerable to the former and safe to the latter.
The palpable necessity of the power to provide and maintain a navy has protected that part of the Constitution
against a spirit of censure, which has spared few other parts. It must, indeed, be numbered among the greatest
blessings of America, that as her Union will be the only source of her maritime strength, so this will be a principal
source of her security against danger from abroad. In this respect our situation bears another likeness to the insular
advantage of Great Britain. The batteries most capable of repelling foreign enterprises on our safety, are happily
such as can never be turned by a perfidious government against our liberties.
The inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of them deeply interested in this provision for naval protection, and if
they have hitherto been suffered to sleep quietly in their beds; if their property has remained safe against the
predatory spirit of licentious adventurers; if their maritime towns have not yet been compelled to ransom
themselves from the terrors of a conflagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and sudden invaders, these
instances of good fortune are not to be ascribed to the capacity of the existing government for the protection of
those from whom it claims allegiance, but to causes that are fugitive and fallacious. If we except perhaps Virginia
and Maryland, which are peculiarly vulnerable on their eastern frontiers, no part of the Union ought to feel more
anxiety on this subject than New York. Her seacoast is extensive. A very important district of the State is an
island. The State itself is penetrated by a large navigable river for more than fifty leagues. The great emporium of
its commerce, the great reservoir of its wealth, lies every moment at the mercy of events, and may almost be
regarded as a hostage for ignominious compliances with the dictates of a foreign enemy, or even with the
rapacious demands of pirates and barbarians. Should a war be the result of the precarious situation of European
affairs, and all the unruly passions attending it be let loose on the ocean, our escape from insults and depredations,
not only on that element, but every part of the other bordering on it, will be truly miraculous. In the present
condition of America, the States more immediately exposed to these calamities have nothing to hope from the
phantom of a general government which now exists; and if their single resources were equal to the task of fortifying
themselves against the danger, the object to be protected would be almost consumed by the means of protecting
them.
The power of regulating and calling forth the militia has been already sufficiently vindicated and explained.
The power of levying and borrowing money, being the sinew of that which is to be exerted in the national defense,
is properly thrown into the same class with it. This power, also, has been examined already with much attention,
and has, I trust, been clearly shown to be necessary, both in the extent and form given to it by the Constitution. I
will address one additional reflection only to those who contend that the power ought to have been restrained to
external taxation by which they mean, taxes on articles imported from other countries. It cannot be doubted that
this will always be a valuable source of revenue; that for a considerable time it must be a principal source; that at
this moment it is an essential one. But we may form very mistaken ideas on this subject, if we do not call to mind in
our calculations, that the extent of revenue drawn from foreign commerce must vary with the variations, both in the
extent and the kind of imports; and that these variations do not correspond with the progress of population, which
must be the general measure of the public wants. As long as agriculture continues the sole field of labor, the
importation of manufactures must increase as the consumers multiply. As soon as domestic manufactures are
begun by the hands not called for by agriculture, the imported manufactures will decrease as the numbers of
people increase. In a more remote stage, the imports may consist in a considerable part of raw materials, which
will be wrought into articles for exportation, and will, therefore, require rather the encouragement of bounties, than
to be loaded with discouraging duties. A system of government, meant for duration, ought to contemplate these
revolutions, and be able to accommodate itself to them.
Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power of taxation, have grounded a very fierce attack against the
Constitution, on the language in which it is defined. It has been urged and echoed, that the power "to lay and
collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general
welfare of the United States," amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged
to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress
under which these writers labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction.
Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the
general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have had some color for it; though it would have
been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate in all possible cases. A
power to destroy the freedom of the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or the
forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by the terms "to raise money for the general welfare.
"But what color can the objection have, when a specification of the objects alluded to by these general terms
immediately follows, and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? If the different parts of the
same instrument ought to be so expounded, as to give meaning to every part which will bear it, shall one part of
the same sentence be excluded altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite
terms be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any signification whatsoever?
For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be
included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase,
and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an enumeration of particulars which
neither explain nor qualify the general meaning, and can have no other effect than to confound and mislead, is an
absurdity, which, as we are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the authors of the objection or on the
authors of the Constitution, we must take the liberty of supposing, had not its origin with the latter.
The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it appears that the language used by the convention is a copy
from the articles of Confederation. The objects of the Union among the States, as described in article third, are
"their common defense, security of their liberties, and mutual and general welfare. " The terms of article eighth are
still more identical: "All charges of war and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense or
general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury," etc.
A similar language again occurs in article ninth. Construe either of these articles by the rules which would justify the
construction put on the new Constitution, and they vest in the existing Congress a power to legislate in all cases
whatsoever. But what would have been thought of that assembly, if, attaching themselves to these general
expressions, and disregarding the specifications which ascertain and limit their import, they had exercised an
unlimited power of providing for the common defense and general welfare? I appeal to the objectors themselves,
whether they would in that case have employed the same reasoning in justification of Congress as they now make
use of against the convention. How difficult it is for error to escape its own condemnation!
PUBLIUS.
| FEDERALIST NO. 41 General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution - James Madison |
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