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To the People of the State of New York:
IT WAS a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the minds of men should stop at that happy
mean which marks the salutary boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of
government with the security of private rights. A failure in this delicate and important point is the great source of
the inconveniences we experience, and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the error, in our future
attempts to rectify and ameliorate our system, we may travel from one chimerical project to another; we may try
change after change; but we shall never be likely to make any material change for the better.
The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of providing for the national defense, is one of those
refinements which owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened. We have seen, however, that
it has not had thus far an extensive prevalency; that even in this country, where it made its first appearance,
Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the only two States by which it has been in any degree patronized; and that
all the others have refused to give it the least countenance; wisely judging that confidence must be placed
somewhere; that the necessity of doing it, is implied in the very act of delegating power; and that it is better to
hazard the abuse of that confidence than to embarrass the government and endanger the public safety by impolitic
restrictions on the legislative authority. The opponents of the proposed Constitution combat, in this respect, the
general decision of America; and instead of being taught by experience the propriety of correcting any extremes
into which we may have heretofore run, they appear disposed to conduct us into others still more dangerous, and
more extravagant. As if the tone of government had been found too high, or too rigid, the doctrines they teach are
calculated to induce us to depress or to relax it, by expedients which, upon other occasions, have been
condemned or forborne. It may be affirmed without the imputation of invective, that if the principles they inculcate,
on various points, could so far obtain as to become the popular creed, they would utterly unfit the people of this
country for any species of government whatever. But a danger of this kind is not to be apprehended. The citizens
of America have too much discernment to be argued into anarchy. And I am much mistaken, if experience has not
wrought a deep and solemn conviction in the public mind, that greater energy of government is essential to the
welfare and prosperity of the community.
It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark the origin and progress of the idea, which aims at the
exclusion of military establishments in time of peace. Though in speculative minds it may arise from a contemplation
of the nature and tendency of such institutions, fortified by the events that have happened in other ages and
countries, yet as a national sentiment, it must be traced to those habits of thinking which we derive from the nation
from whom the inhabitants of these States have in general sprung.
In England, for a long time after the Norman Conquest, the authority of the monarch was almost unlimited. Inroads
were gradually made upon the prerogative, in favor of liberty, first by the barons, and afterwards by the people, till
the greatest part of its most formidable pretensions became extinct. But it was not till the revolution in 1688, which
elevated the Prince of Orange to the throne of Great Britain, that English liberty was completely triumphant. As
incident to the undefined power of making war, an acknowledged prerogative of the crown, Charles II had, by his
own authority, kept on foot in time of peace a body of 5,000 regular troops. And this number James II increased
to 30,000; who were paid out of his civil list. At the revolution, to abolish the exercise of so dangerous an
authority, it became an article of the Bill of Rights then framed, that "the raising or keeping a standing army within
the kingdom in time of peace, UNLESS WITH THE CONSENT OF PARLIAMENT, was against law."
In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its highest pitch, no security against the danger of standing armies
was thought requisite, beyond a prohibition of their being raised or kept up by the mere authority of the executive
magistrate. The patriots, who effected that memorable revolution, were too temperate, too well informed, to think
of any restraint on the legislative discretion. They were aware that a certain number of troops for guards and
garrisons were indispensable; that no precise bounds could be set to the national exigencies; that a power equal to
every possible contingency must exist somewhere in the government: and that when they referred the exercise of
that power to the judgment of the legislature, they had arrived at the ultimate point of precaution which was
reconcilable with the safety of the community.
From the same source, the people of America may be said to have derived an hereditary impression of danger to
liberty, from standing armies in time of peace. The circumstances of a revolution quickened the public sensibility on
every point connected with the security of popular rights, and in some instances raise the warmth of our zeal
beyond the degree which consisted with the due temperature of the body politic. The attempts of two of the States
to restrict the authority of the legislature in the article of military establishments, are of the number of these
instances. The principles which had taught us to be jealous of the power of an hereditary monarch were by an
injudicious excess extended to the representatives of the people in their popular assemblies. Even in some of the
States, where this error was not adopted, we find unnecessary declarations that standing armies ought not to be
kept up, in time of peace, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE. I call them unnecessary,
because the reason which had introduced a similar provision into the English Bill of Rights is not applicable to any
of the State constitutions. The power of raising armies at all, under those constitutions, can by no construction be
deemed to reside anywhere else, than in the legislatures themselves; and it was superfluous, if not absurd, to
declare that a matter should not be done without the consent of a body, which alone had the power of doing it.
Accordingly, in some of these constitutions, and among others, in that of this State of New York, which has been
justly celebrated, both in Europe and America, as one of the best of the forms of government established in this
country, there is a total silence upon the subject.
It is remarkable, that even in the two States which seem to have meditated an interdiction of military establishments
in time of peace, the mode of expression made use of is rather cautionary than prohibitory. It is not said, that
standing armies SHALL NOT BE kept up, but that they OUGHT NOT to be kept up, in time of peace. This
ambiguity of terms appears to have been the result of a conflict between jealousy and conviction; between the
desire of excluding such establishments at all events, and the persuasion that an absolute exclusion would be
unwise and unsafe. Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever the situation of public affairs was
understood to require a departure from it, would be interpreted by the legislature into a mere admonition, and
would be made to yield to the necessities or supposed necessities of the State? Let the fact already mentioned,
with respect to Pennsylvania, decide. What then (it may be asked) is the use of such a provision, if it cease to
operate the moment there is an inclination to disregard it?
Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in point of efficacy, between the provision alluded to and that
which is contained in the new Constitution, for restraining the appropriations of money for military purposes to the
period of two years. The former, by aiming at too much, is calculated to effect nothing; the latter, by steering clear
of an imprudent extreme, and by being perfectly compatible with a proper provision for the exigencies of the
nation, will have a salutary and powerful operation.
The legislature of the United States will be OBLIGED, by this provision, once at least in every two years, to
deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to
declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not AT LIBERTY to
vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if they were even incautious enough
to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence. As the spirit of party, in different degrees, must be expected
to infect all political bodies, there will be, no doubt, persons in the national legislature willing enough to arraign the
measures and criminate the views of the majority. The provision for the support of a military force will always be a
favorable topic for declamation. As often as the question comes forward, the public attention will be roused and
attracted to the subject, by the party in opposition; and if the majority should be really disposed to exceed the
proper limits, the community will be warned of the danger, and will have an opportunity of taking measures to
guard against it. Independent of parties in the national legislature itself, as often as the period of discussion arrived,
the State legislatures, who will always be not only vigilant but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights of the
citizens against encroachments from the federal government, will constantly have their attention awake to the
conduct of the national rulers, and will be ready enough, if any thing improper appears, to sound the alarm to the
people, and not only to be the VOICE, but, if necessary, the ARM of their discontent.
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community REQUIRE TIME to mature them for execution. An army,
so large as seriously to menace those liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations; which would
suppose, not merely a temporary combination between the legislature and executive, but a continued conspiracy
for a series of time. Is it probable that such a combination would exist at all? Is it probable that it would be
persevered in, and transmitted along through all the successive variations in a representative body, which biennial
elections would naturally produce in both houses? Is it presumable, that every man, the instant he took his seat in
the national Senate or House of Representatives, would commence a traitor to his constituents and to his country?
Can it be supposed that there would not be found one man, discerning enough to detect so atrocious a conspiracy,
or bold or honest enough to apprise his constituents of their danger? If such presumptions can fairly be made,
there ought at once to be an end of all delegated authority. The people should resolve to recall all the powers they
have heretofore parted with out of their own hands, and to divide themselves into as many States as there are
counties, in order that they may be able to manage their own concerns in person.
If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the concealment of the design, for any duration, would
be impracticable. It would be announced, by the very circumstance of augmenting the army to so great an extent in
time of profound peace. What colorable reason could be assigned, in a country so situated, for such vast
augmentations of the military force? It is impossible that the people could be long deceived; and the destruction of
the project, and of the projectors, would quickly follow the discovery.
It has been said that the provision which limits the appropriation of money for the support of an army to the period
of two years would be unavailing, because the Executive, when once possessed of a force large enough to awe the
people into submission, would find resources in that very force sufficient to enable him to dispense with supplies
from the acts of the legislature. But the question again recurs, upon what pretense could he be put in possession of
a force of that magnitude in time of peace? If we suppose it to have been created in consequence of some
domestic insurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a case not within the principles of the objection; for this is
levelled against the power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few persons will be so visionary as seriously to
contend that military forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebellion or resist an invasion; and if the defense of the
community under such circumstances should make it necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard its
liberty, this is one of those calamaties for which there is neither preventative nor cure. It cannot be provided
against by any possible form of government; it might even result from a simple league offensive and defensive, if it
should ever be necessary for the confederates or allies to form an army for common defense.
But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a united than in a disunited state; nay, it may be safely asserted
that it is an evil altogether unlikely to attend us in the latter situation. It is not easy to conceive a possibility that
dangers so formidable can assail the whole Union, as to demand a force considerable enough to place our liberties
in the least jeopardy, especially if we take into our view the aid to be derived from the militia, which ought always
to be counted upon as a valuable and powerful auxiliary. But in a state of disunion (as has been fully shown in
another place), the contrary of this supposition would become not only probable, but almost unavoidable.
PUBLIUS.
IT WAS a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the minds of men should stop at that happy
mean which marks the salutary boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of
government with the security of private rights. A failure in this delicate and important point is the great source of
the inconveniences we experience, and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the error, in our future
attempts to rectify and ameliorate our system, we may travel from one chimerical project to another; we may try
change after change; but we shall never be likely to make any material change for the better.
The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of providing for the national defense, is one of those
refinements which owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened. We have seen, however, that
it has not had thus far an extensive prevalency; that even in this country, where it made its first appearance,
Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the only two States by which it has been in any degree patronized; and that
all the others have refused to give it the least countenance; wisely judging that confidence must be placed
somewhere; that the necessity of doing it, is implied in the very act of delegating power; and that it is better to
hazard the abuse of that confidence than to embarrass the government and endanger the public safety by impolitic
restrictions on the legislative authority. The opponents of the proposed Constitution combat, in this respect, the
general decision of America; and instead of being taught by experience the propriety of correcting any extremes
into which we may have heretofore run, they appear disposed to conduct us into others still more dangerous, and
more extravagant. As if the tone of government had been found too high, or too rigid, the doctrines they teach are
calculated to induce us to depress or to relax it, by expedients which, upon other occasions, have been
condemned or forborne. It may be affirmed without the imputation of invective, that if the principles they inculcate,
on various points, could so far obtain as to become the popular creed, they would utterly unfit the people of this
country for any species of government whatever. But a danger of this kind is not to be apprehended. The citizens
of America have too much discernment to be argued into anarchy. And I am much mistaken, if experience has not
wrought a deep and solemn conviction in the public mind, that greater energy of government is essential to the
welfare and prosperity of the community.
It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark the origin and progress of the idea, which aims at the
exclusion of military establishments in time of peace. Though in speculative minds it may arise from a contemplation
of the nature and tendency of such institutions, fortified by the events that have happened in other ages and
countries, yet as a national sentiment, it must be traced to those habits of thinking which we derive from the nation
from whom the inhabitants of these States have in general sprung.
In England, for a long time after the Norman Conquest, the authority of the monarch was almost unlimited. Inroads
were gradually made upon the prerogative, in favor of liberty, first by the barons, and afterwards by the people, till
the greatest part of its most formidable pretensions became extinct. But it was not till the revolution in 1688, which
elevated the Prince of Orange to the throne of Great Britain, that English liberty was completely triumphant. As
incident to the undefined power of making war, an acknowledged prerogative of the crown, Charles II had, by his
own authority, kept on foot in time of peace a body of 5,000 regular troops. And this number James II increased
to 30,000; who were paid out of his civil list. At the revolution, to abolish the exercise of so dangerous an
authority, it became an article of the Bill of Rights then framed, that "the raising or keeping a standing army within
the kingdom in time of peace, UNLESS WITH THE CONSENT OF PARLIAMENT, was against law."
In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its highest pitch, no security against the danger of standing armies
was thought requisite, beyond a prohibition of their being raised or kept up by the mere authority of the executive
magistrate. The patriots, who effected that memorable revolution, were too temperate, too well informed, to think
of any restraint on the legislative discretion. They were aware that a certain number of troops for guards and
garrisons were indispensable; that no precise bounds could be set to the national exigencies; that a power equal to
every possible contingency must exist somewhere in the government: and that when they referred the exercise of
that power to the judgment of the legislature, they had arrived at the ultimate point of precaution which was
reconcilable with the safety of the community.
From the same source, the people of America may be said to have derived an hereditary impression of danger to
liberty, from standing armies in time of peace. The circumstances of a revolution quickened the public sensibility on
every point connected with the security of popular rights, and in some instances raise the warmth of our zeal
beyond the degree which consisted with the due temperature of the body politic. The attempts of two of the States
to restrict the authority of the legislature in the article of military establishments, are of the number of these
instances. The principles which had taught us to be jealous of the power of an hereditary monarch were by an
injudicious excess extended to the representatives of the people in their popular assemblies. Even in some of the
States, where this error was not adopted, we find unnecessary declarations that standing armies ought not to be
kept up, in time of peace, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE. I call them unnecessary,
because the reason which had introduced a similar provision into the English Bill of Rights is not applicable to any
of the State constitutions. The power of raising armies at all, under those constitutions, can by no construction be
deemed to reside anywhere else, than in the legislatures themselves; and it was superfluous, if not absurd, to
declare that a matter should not be done without the consent of a body, which alone had the power of doing it.
Accordingly, in some of these constitutions, and among others, in that of this State of New York, which has been
justly celebrated, both in Europe and America, as one of the best of the forms of government established in this
country, there is a total silence upon the subject.
It is remarkable, that even in the two States which seem to have meditated an interdiction of military establishments
in time of peace, the mode of expression made use of is rather cautionary than prohibitory. It is not said, that
standing armies SHALL NOT BE kept up, but that they OUGHT NOT to be kept up, in time of peace. This
ambiguity of terms appears to have been the result of a conflict between jealousy and conviction; between the
desire of excluding such establishments at all events, and the persuasion that an absolute exclusion would be
unwise and unsafe. Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever the situation of public affairs was
understood to require a departure from it, would be interpreted by the legislature into a mere admonition, and
would be made to yield to the necessities or supposed necessities of the State? Let the fact already mentioned,
with respect to Pennsylvania, decide. What then (it may be asked) is the use of such a provision, if it cease to
operate the moment there is an inclination to disregard it?
Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in point of efficacy, between the provision alluded to and that
which is contained in the new Constitution, for restraining the appropriations of money for military purposes to the
period of two years. The former, by aiming at too much, is calculated to effect nothing; the latter, by steering clear
of an imprudent extreme, and by being perfectly compatible with a proper provision for the exigencies of the
nation, will have a salutary and powerful operation.
The legislature of the United States will be OBLIGED, by this provision, once at least in every two years, to
deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to
declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not AT LIBERTY to
vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if they were even incautious enough
to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence. As the spirit of party, in different degrees, must be expected
to infect all political bodies, there will be, no doubt, persons in the national legislature willing enough to arraign the
measures and criminate the views of the majority. The provision for the support of a military force will always be a
favorable topic for declamation. As often as the question comes forward, the public attention will be roused and
attracted to the subject, by the party in opposition; and if the majority should be really disposed to exceed the
proper limits, the community will be warned of the danger, and will have an opportunity of taking measures to
guard against it. Independent of parties in the national legislature itself, as often as the period of discussion arrived,
the State legislatures, who will always be not only vigilant but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights of the
citizens against encroachments from the federal government, will constantly have their attention awake to the
conduct of the national rulers, and will be ready enough, if any thing improper appears, to sound the alarm to the
people, and not only to be the VOICE, but, if necessary, the ARM of their discontent.
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community REQUIRE TIME to mature them for execution. An army,
so large as seriously to menace those liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations; which would
suppose, not merely a temporary combination between the legislature and executive, but a continued conspiracy
for a series of time. Is it probable that such a combination would exist at all? Is it probable that it would be
persevered in, and transmitted along through all the successive variations in a representative body, which biennial
elections would naturally produce in both houses? Is it presumable, that every man, the instant he took his seat in
the national Senate or House of Representatives, would commence a traitor to his constituents and to his country?
Can it be supposed that there would not be found one man, discerning enough to detect so atrocious a conspiracy,
or bold or honest enough to apprise his constituents of their danger? If such presumptions can fairly be made,
there ought at once to be an end of all delegated authority. The people should resolve to recall all the powers they
have heretofore parted with out of their own hands, and to divide themselves into as many States as there are
counties, in order that they may be able to manage their own concerns in person.
If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the concealment of the design, for any duration, would
be impracticable. It would be announced, by the very circumstance of augmenting the army to so great an extent in
time of profound peace. What colorable reason could be assigned, in a country so situated, for such vast
augmentations of the military force? It is impossible that the people could be long deceived; and the destruction of
the project, and of the projectors, would quickly follow the discovery.
It has been said that the provision which limits the appropriation of money for the support of an army to the period
of two years would be unavailing, because the Executive, when once possessed of a force large enough to awe the
people into submission, would find resources in that very force sufficient to enable him to dispense with supplies
from the acts of the legislature. But the question again recurs, upon what pretense could he be put in possession of
a force of that magnitude in time of peace? If we suppose it to have been created in consequence of some
domestic insurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a case not within the principles of the objection; for this is
levelled against the power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few persons will be so visionary as seriously to
contend that military forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebellion or resist an invasion; and if the defense of the
community under such circumstances should make it necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard its
liberty, this is one of those calamaties for which there is neither preventative nor cure. It cannot be provided
against by any possible form of government; it might even result from a simple league offensive and defensive, if it
should ever be necessary for the confederates or allies to form an army for common defense.
But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a united than in a disunited state; nay, it may be safely asserted
that it is an evil altogether unlikely to attend us in the latter situation. It is not easy to conceive a possibility that
dangers so formidable can assail the whole Union, as to demand a force considerable enough to place our liberties
in the least jeopardy, especially if we take into our view the aid to be derived from the militia, which ought always
to be counted upon as a valuable and powerful auxiliary. But in a state of disunion (as has been fully shown in
another place), the contrary of this supposition would become not only probable, but almost unavoidable.
PUBLIUS.
| FEDERALIST NO. 26 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered - Alexander Hamilton |
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